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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTRUCTION OF CONVEYANCE MADE IN EXCHANGE FOR
THE GRANTEE'S PROMISE TO SUPPORT THE GRANTOR
A conveyed realty to B by deed which stated that the major part
of the consideration was B's promise to "properly provide all neces-
saries" for B during the remainder of the latter's life. Later A and B
were married and lived together as husband and wife until A's death,
a year after the marriage. A's collateral heirs brought an action to
cancel the deed. The chancellor canceled it on the ground that there
had been a failure of consideration. On cross-appeal B contends that
the right of rescission was personal to the grantor and did not pass to
and vest in A's heirs. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
chancellor and allowed the conveyance to stand. The Court said, how-
ever, "where the circumstances and the language of the deed authorize
the inference that the consideration . . . was intended by the parties
to be a condition subsequent," the heirs "should" obtain relief.
Manning v. Street, 279 Ky. 253, 130 S. W. (2d) 735 (1939).
This case raises the problem-how should a conveyence made in
exchange for the grantee's promise to support the grantor be con-
strued, and as a consequence or incident of such construction whether
the heirs of the grantor may obtain relief. There are at least three
different constructions which have been placed upon grants in con-
sideration of care and maintenance; namely, the promise is merely a
covenant, or it is a continuing obligation in the nature of a trust, or it
raises by implication a condition subsequent. When there is a breach
of such an agreement, relief consistent with one of the preceding inter-
pretations may be granted, or relief may be based on a presumably
fraudulent procurement of the conveyance, or equity may cancel the
deed for failure of consideration. Each of these remedies will receive
further consideration in the paragraphs which follow.
1) When only the words of the instrument are considered, perhaps
the most natural construction of the grantee's promise to support the
grantor would be that it is a covenant. Accordingly, some courts have
held such promises to be covenants; and that the remedy for breach
thereof is to ascertain the costs of the support and enforce the judg-
ment as a lien.' Should these courts refuse to allow assessment of
prospective damages, then the grantor would be compelled to bring an
2Rosek v. Kotzur, 267 S. W. 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). 1 Tiffany,
Real Property, (3rd ed.) page 376, footnote 45.
". .. when the consideration is shown in the conveyance not to
have been paid, a lien exists for its payment." Webster v. Cadwallader,
133 Ky. 500, 505, 118 S. W. 327, 328 (1909) (in this case the covenant
was treated as a lien without a judgment). However, the courts in
Kentucky may grant rescission of the contract: Wireman v. Wireman,
259 Ky. 120, 81 S. W. (2d) 908 (1935); Reeder v. Reeder, 89 Ky. 529, 12
S. W. 1063 (1890); or cancel the deed, Watson v. Gilliam, 252 Ky. 762,
68 S. W. (2d) 399 (1934).
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indefinite number of suits. Future damages-the cost of support of the
grantor for the remainder of his life-are, however, no more indefinite
or speculative than are damages in cases involving personal injuries of
a permanent character, or in actions for wrongful death. Life expec-
tancy tables may be used in either case. But this apparent difficulty
In the ascertainment of damages, as well as rules forbidding recovery
of future damages, has given equity jurisdiction because the remedy
at law is inadequate.' The heirs of the grantor would not ordinarily
be permitted to recover for breach of the grantee's promise to supp6rt
the grantor, since the covenant is for the personal benefit of the
grantor.'
2) In Rhode Island a cancellation of a deed and an accounting
between the parties was decreed on the theory that "a continuing
obligation on the part of the grantee, in the nature of a trust" was
created by the conveyance.' In that case the contract to support was
oral. It would seem that written contracts contained In the conveyance
might also be construed to create "implied trusts". Relief under this
view is based on the theory that failure to support the grantor is a
renunciation of the trust.
3) Some courts have held the failure to support the grantor a
breach of a condition subsequent although the conveyance merely
stated that such obligation is a part of the consideration.' The Ken-
tucky court has not removed the strict rules of construction usually
applied to conditions subsequent to the extent of reaching that result.'
It should be noted that breach of a condition subsequent results in
2Whittaker v. Trammell, 86 Ark. 251, 110 S. W. 1041 (1908);
Reeder v. Reeder, 89 Ky. 529, 12 S. W. 1063 (1890); CrIm v. Holsberry,
42 W. Va. 667, 26 S. E. 314 (1896).
'Little v. Little, 205 N. C. 1, 169 S. E. 799 (1933).
'Grant v. Bell, 26 R. L 288, 58 Atl. 951 (1904). See Tiffany, Real
Property (3rd ed.) See. 216, and footnote 43.
5 Blum v. Bush, 86 Mich. 206, 49 N. W. 142 (1891).
"It seems to be the settled rule in this jurisdiction that a grant of
lands in consideration of an agreement for the future support of the
grantor, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary creates in the
grantee an estate on condition subsequent." Huffman v. Ricketts,
60 Ind. App. 526, 111 N. E. 322, 325 (1916).
"Conveyances like the present, made by aged people in considera-
tion of support and care are deemed to be conveyances made upon con-
dition subsequent and will be set aside by a court of equity upon proof
of substantial failure to perform." Young v. Young, 157 Wis. 424, 147
N. W. 361, 362 (1914).
8 R. C. L. 1113, Deeds, section 173.
0 Manning v. Street, supra, held that such promise was not a condi-
tion subsequent of which the heirs of the grantor may obtain relief.
Dictum in the case suggests that had such stipulation constituted a con-
dition subsequent, then the heirs should have been entitled to relief.
The Court of Appeals has, however, found a condition subsequent where
the deed provided that on the grantee's failure to provide the agreed
support, the grantor should have the right to sell the land for said
support--a lien having been retained upon the land for that purpose.
Adkins v. Adkins, 171 Ky. 762, 188 S. W. 843 (1916).
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a forfeiture when the proper steps are tasen by the grantor or his heirs.
For that reason the courts have developed an aversion toward them,
which is manifested by strict rules of construction. T Generally, the
words of the deed must clearly show the existence of such condition,
and must not admit of any other reasonable interpretation.8 Notwith-
standing the oft repeated assertion that the intention of the grantor is
to prevail, the cases show that the desire of the grantor is material only
to the extent that it is expressed by, or may be implied from, the lan-
guage of the instrument.'
Implied conditions subsequent are not expressed by unmistakable
words of condition; consequently with the strict rules of construction
usually being applied to conditions subsequent there are but few
Instances of "implied conditions subsequent". The most notable
instances of an implied condition subsequent are those cases in which
the grant Is construed to be upon condition subsequent when the con-
sideration for the conveyance is the grantee's promise to support the
grantor. Under such circumstances "a condition subsequent arises by
clear Implication," asserted the Wisconsin court in Glocke v. Glocke.P
In cases of this nature a forfeiture is less odious since other remedies -
are thought to be inadequate. But some courts, notwithstanding the
fact that they deem such grants to be on condition subsequent in favor
of the grantor, refuse to allow the benefit of this construction to extend
to the heirs of the grantor.n In the usual situation of a condition
broken the heirs of the grantor have a cause of action. The principal
11 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.) Sec. 193.
words of the deed must clearly show the existence of such condition,
8 Bain v. Parker, 77 Ark. 168, 90 S. W. 1000 (1905); Studdard v.
Wells, 120 Mo. 25, 25 S. W. 201 (1894); Grantz v. Highland Scenic P.
Co., 165 Mo. 211, 65 S. W. 223, 225 (1901).
Examples: Land conveyed "as and for a public street of said city,"
is not granted on a condition subsequent. Avery v. United States, 104
Fed. 711, 44 C. C. A. 161 (1900). Where full consideration was received,
land granted "for a public school house, as the property of the schools
of said county, and for no other purpose, in fee," did not create a condi-
tion subsequent. Faith v. Bowles, 86 Md. 13, 37 Atl. 711 (1897) (This
case reviews a number of cases on conditions subsequent).
"'One of the first canons of construction is that the intention of
the grantor must be ascertained. But intention is a term of art, signi-
fying the meaning of the writing. . ... As has been said, the inten-
tion of the grantor must be found within the 'four corners' of the deed."
Antley v. Antley, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31, 32 (1925).
"... the inquiry always is to ascertain what he meant by what
he said rather than his reasons for saying it, and his reasons are perti-
nent only in so far as they explain what he said." Garrott v. McCon-
nell, 201 Ky. 61, 64, 265 S. W. 14, 15 (1923).
" 113 Wis. 303, 89 N. W. 118 (1902).
n 1 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.) page 379-380.
See Malicki v. Malicki, 189 Minn. 121, 248 N. W. 723 (1933), in,
which the court said that the alleged breach was of a peculiarly per-
sonal obligation obviously beneficial to the grantors alone and not
available in kind to their heirs and assigns.
Is 1 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.) See. 208.
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case assumes that if there were a condition subsequent, the usual
remedies would extend to the heirs of the grantor."
4) Deeds of realty given for support have been canceled upon the
theory that neglect of or refusal by the grantee to take care of the
grantor raises a presumption that the grantee made the contract with-
out intending to perform it, and consequently that the conveyance was
obtained by fraud.1" Under this theory, since relief is given only when
the facts warrant the interference of fraud,25 the grantor is without
remedy when performance becomes impossible through no fault of the
grantee.
5) A great many cases have granted relief without stating the
theory thereof upon a finding that there has been a failure of considera-
tion.11 Equity in the exercise of its discretion grants aid and determines
the extent thereof." It is unconscionable to allow the grantee to retain
the property without making recompense therefor. Where there is
only a partial failure of consideration equity might refuse to lend its
aid."8
The result of the principal case may be justified under either of the
views mentioned in this comment. Should we construe the grantee's
promise to be a covenant, the heirs would not be entitled to a rescission
of the conveyance-the covenant obviously being for the benefit of the
grantor as an individual. Even though there was a partial failure of
consideration, the heirs did not show they had suffered thereby;"9 and
had the grantee fully performed his obligation the heirs would have
realized nothing. Under the "implied trust theory" the heirs would
not have been beneficiaries. Nor are there sufficient indications that
the conveyance was procured by fraud for the court to cancel the
instrument on that ground. And had a condition subsequent been
inferred from the circumstances and the language of the deed, it would
not necessarily have followed that the heirs could have obtained relief."
even though there is dictum in the case to that effect. However, the
- 279 Ky. 253, 259, 130 S. W. (2d) 735, 738 (1939).
141 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.) page 375, and footnote 39
under section 216.
Relief is based on the theory that the grantee's refusal to comply
raises a presumption that he did not intend to comply with it in the
first instance, making the contract fraudulent in its inception. Steb-
bins v. Petty, 209 Ill. 291, 70 N. E. 673 (1904).
21 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.) Sec. 216.
2 Ibid.
"Clearly, if the entire consideration for the conveyance has failed,
the chancellor ought to rescind the contract, and put the parties in
statu quo." Lane v. Lane, 106 Ky. 530, 532, 50 S. W. 857 (1899).
2T Maddox v. Maddox, 135 Ky. 403, 122 S. W. 201 (1909); Luster v.
Whitlock, 203 Ky. 405, 262 S. W. 572 (1924).
"1 Tiffany, Real'Property (3rd ed.) page 377, footnote 47..
19 "Assuming that the evidence demonstrated a failure of considera-
tion, the-right to have a conveyance set aside for that reason is purely
personal to the grantor, and that right is not transferred to his heirs
or devisees." Haslinger v. Gabel, 344 Ill. 254; 176 N. E. 340, 344 (1931).
2 Supra, footnote 11.
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court did not infer a condition subsequent, and their finding is in har-
mony with the usual rules of construction for conditions subsequent.
CLARENCE CORNELIUS.
CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE WITHIN A CERTAIN AREA
WITHOUT A PROVISION FOR AN EXPRESS SALE
OF GOOD WILL
As a part of the contract by which he sold his hospital in Floyd
County to the plaintiffs, the defendant agreed not to own or operate a
hospital in that county for ten years. Under the same agreement he
assigned to the plaintiffs hospitalization contracts with the county and
a labor union, together with his good will. Within two years he erected
another hospital in Knott County, three hundred yards from the Floyd
County line. Many of the defendant's former patients, residing in
Floyd County, began to patronize his new hospital instead of that of
the plaintiffs. The latter sought to enjoin the defendant from receiving
these former patients on the ground that he was breaching his contract
not to compete with the plaintiffs in Floyd County. The lower court
enjoined the defendant from receiving the patients covered by the
assigned contracts, but refused to enjoin him from receiving any other
patients. This decision was reversed upon appeal and the defendant
was enjoined from receiving at his hospital, for the remainder of the
ten year period, any patients from Floyd County.'
By the contract there was an express sale of good will as to the
assigned contracts, but mention was not made of a sale of the good will
of the hospital. Nevertheless, the sale of a business includes an implied
transfer of good will, though there is no stipulation to that effect in the
contract.2 The only effect of this implied sale of good will is to raise
an obligation on the part of the seller not to derogate from his grant by
directly interfering with the business which he has sold to the
purchaser.3
However, this obligation does not extend so far as to preclude the
transferor from opening up a new business in competition with that of
the purchaser. While he could not directly interfere with the business
that he has sold to the purchaser by soliciting his old customers, he
could Indirectly interfere with it by dealing with them when they came
to him of their own accord.' That was what the defendant did here.
Since it was not alleged that the defendant solicited any of his former
customers or did anything else that would amount to a direct inter-
'Johnson et al. v. Stumb et al., 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 165
(1938).
2 Johnson v. Bruzek, 142 Minn. 454, 172 N. W. 700 (1909). See
Madox v. Fuller, 173 So. 12, 14 (Ala. 1937); 5 Williston on
Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), sec. 1640.
'5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), sec. 1640.4 Ibid.
